As presented, the book assumes that the locus of choice as to whether to keep or lose the empire was in Britain. But it very much was not - India, the lynch-pin of empire east of Suez, was leaving whether or not Britain wanted it to. Australia pivoted to the US mid-war. South Africa and Canada too went their own ways. The scatter of dependencies left were a burden, not an asset.
I think that is a bit anachronistic. It is certainly true, for example, that the empire was not a burden in the late 40s — it was a valuable source of dollars! Similarly, Cain and Hopkins are right that the 50s were in many ways the period when the empire was strongest. In economic terms, Australia’s pivot might seem inevitable now, but it was not then.
I’m not 100% behind Cain and Hopkins, but I think they deserve more credit than you give there — things are never as inevitable as they can seem now!
Finance isn't everything. Pre-war, India paid for half the British Army and all its own, and its position allowed put those forces within easy reach of all between Aden and Singapore. If Britain wanted to keep anything in the area, it would have to pay from its own pocket. The Treasury was more than aware of this, and was keen to get rid of these possessions.
Of course! I’m not saying finance is everything. But the British empire does not end with WW2 and Indian independence. Explaining why it lasts so long after then is the real question, and looking to the sterling area and its demise is a reasonable approach. Remember Britain did not actually leave ‘east of suez’ until the late sixties, two decades after India left. The payments situation of the Wilson government mattered a lot more than India’s loss decades earlier.
"Lasts so long after then?" Malaya went in 1957, Nigeria in 1960. Kenya in 1963. In terms of imperial history, the blink of an eye. By 1970 all that was left were a scatter of islands, which the Treasury encouraged to become self-supporting tax havens.
More generally, the difference between wealth based on selling something (spices, steam engines, transport, insurance ...) to wealth based on income from investment is that the latter crucially depends on relative power. Money, after all, is a debt, and debts can be renegotiated, defaulted on, denied, expropriated ...For Britain, see Mossadegh, Suez. World War II saw a very marked decline in Britain's relative power. The US had, of course, an interest in ensuring debts were paid in general, but was less then enthusiastic about backing British credit.
As presented, the book assumes that the locus of choice as to whether to keep or lose the empire was in Britain. But it very much was not - India, the lynch-pin of empire east of Suez, was leaving whether or not Britain wanted it to. Australia pivoted to the US mid-war. South Africa and Canada too went their own ways. The scatter of dependencies left were a burden, not an asset.
I think that is a bit anachronistic. It is certainly true, for example, that the empire was not a burden in the late 40s — it was a valuable source of dollars! Similarly, Cain and Hopkins are right that the 50s were in many ways the period when the empire was strongest. In economic terms, Australia’s pivot might seem inevitable now, but it was not then.
I’m not 100% behind Cain and Hopkins, but I think they deserve more credit than you give there — things are never as inevitable as they can seem now!
Finance isn't everything. Pre-war, India paid for half the British Army and all its own, and its position allowed put those forces within easy reach of all between Aden and Singapore. If Britain wanted to keep anything in the area, it would have to pay from its own pocket. The Treasury was more than aware of this, and was keen to get rid of these possessions.
Of course! I’m not saying finance is everything. But the British empire does not end with WW2 and Indian independence. Explaining why it lasts so long after then is the real question, and looking to the sterling area and its demise is a reasonable approach. Remember Britain did not actually leave ‘east of suez’ until the late sixties, two decades after India left. The payments situation of the Wilson government mattered a lot more than India’s loss decades earlier.
"Lasts so long after then?" Malaya went in 1957, Nigeria in 1960. Kenya in 1963. In terms of imperial history, the blink of an eye. By 1970 all that was left were a scatter of islands, which the Treasury encouraged to become self-supporting tax havens.
More generally, the difference between wealth based on selling something (spices, steam engines, transport, insurance ...) to wealth based on income from investment is that the latter crucially depends on relative power. Money, after all, is a debt, and debts can be renegotiated, defaulted on, denied, expropriated ...For Britain, see Mossadegh, Suez. World War II saw a very marked decline in Britain's relative power. The US had, of course, an interest in ensuring debts were paid in general, but was less then enthusiastic about backing British credit.