The assumption that modern capitalism has its roots in medieval or early modern exchange networks is long-standing (and still very much current). Yet I cannot help but think that absent the steam engine exchange networks - European, Arabian, Chinese - would have continued to develop, become more interlinked and yet the world remain much the same: land as the primary basis of production and wealth, commerce influential but secondary, empires cycling through rise and fall ...Simply, the scale and reach of modernity is unattainable without fossil fuels.
I suppose the question is whether the steam engine - and all that followed it -- was endogenous to the development of those exchange networks... could you have had an industrial revolution without capitalism, so to speak...
I see no reason why not. Plenty of other inventions and refinements have been made with capitalism. Commerce, private property and entrepreneurialism are all old habits - as old as agriculture or older (a medieval lord who - as many did - offered good terms to attract peasants to clear forest or reclaim marsh was just as much an entrepreneur as any Genoese merchant). But once you have fossil fuel power you will, I think, get some form of capitalism - the commodification of everyday life.
That should be 'without capitalism'. One point worth thinking about is that the timescale to realise 'industrialism' is longer than most posit. Newcomen's engine goes back to 1712, Watt to 1776, rail to the 1820s, replicable precision to the 1850s, routine steamships to the 1860s, with the politics catching up in Europe and North America only in the 20th century (see eg Arno Mayer The Persistence of the Old Regime), then extending to the rest of the world after that in fits and starts - eg China from the 80s. Parts of the world are still not integrated into the web of production and exchange, global politics is still in catch-up. So the final form of 'capitalism' is unclear - it's a process, not a template.
« a result of its ‘overextension’; as low domestic interest rates and a glut of capital caused Amsterdam to burden the European economy with a volume of credit money it could not handle» In which way was the economy unable to handle a glut of ‘cheap money’?
Good question! Braudel does not go into too much detail, but we can assume he means that there were not enough profitable investment opportunities. Most of Europe (outside of the Netherlands) had only basic financial markets and little economic development at this time, and so it was difficult to actually invest capital beyond a point. Hence, Dutch funds end up being channeled towards states who borrow more than they can handle, eventually leaving the Dutch investors holding the bag.
The assumption that modern capitalism has its roots in medieval or early modern exchange networks is long-standing (and still very much current). Yet I cannot help but think that absent the steam engine exchange networks - European, Arabian, Chinese - would have continued to develop, become more interlinked and yet the world remain much the same: land as the primary basis of production and wealth, commerce influential but secondary, empires cycling through rise and fall ...Simply, the scale and reach of modernity is unattainable without fossil fuels.
I suppose the question is whether the steam engine - and all that followed it -- was endogenous to the development of those exchange networks... could you have had an industrial revolution without capitalism, so to speak...
I see no reason why not. Plenty of other inventions and refinements have been made with capitalism. Commerce, private property and entrepreneurialism are all old habits - as old as agriculture or older (a medieval lord who - as many did - offered good terms to attract peasants to clear forest or reclaim marsh was just as much an entrepreneur as any Genoese merchant). But once you have fossil fuel power you will, I think, get some form of capitalism - the commodification of everyday life.
That should be 'without capitalism'. One point worth thinking about is that the timescale to realise 'industrialism' is longer than most posit. Newcomen's engine goes back to 1712, Watt to 1776, rail to the 1820s, replicable precision to the 1850s, routine steamships to the 1860s, with the politics catching up in Europe and North America only in the 20th century (see eg Arno Mayer The Persistence of the Old Regime), then extending to the rest of the world after that in fits and starts - eg China from the 80s. Parts of the world are still not integrated into the web of production and exchange, global politics is still in catch-up. So the final form of 'capitalism' is unclear - it's a process, not a template.
« a result of its ‘overextension’; as low domestic interest rates and a glut of capital caused Amsterdam to burden the European economy with a volume of credit money it could not handle» In which way was the economy unable to handle a glut of ‘cheap money’?
Good question! Braudel does not go into too much detail, but we can assume he means that there were not enough profitable investment opportunities. Most of Europe (outside of the Netherlands) had only basic financial markets and little economic development at this time, and so it was difficult to actually invest capital beyond a point. Hence, Dutch funds end up being channeled towards states who borrow more than they can handle, eventually leaving the Dutch investors holding the bag.